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THE ART OF SUBSIDIZING FUEL-FREE ELECTRICITY UNDER THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA AGREEMENT AS ILLUSTRATED
BY NORWAY'S REVERSION INSTRUMENT
PETER OREBECH*
The Commission has made it clear that a market based approach is the
only stable base for climate change sustainable in the long term. But it
has also acknowledged that subsidies will be needed, where we are faced
with market failure.-Herbert Ungererl
INTRODUCTION: THE "STATE AID" CONUNDRUM 2
This article focuses on legal frames to national state aid, specifically,
the ban on national aid that distorts competition in the electrical power
trade. Does the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) 3 ban on state
aid ruin the flourishing of the new green energy sector? By the illustration
of an EEA case (EFTA v. Norway)4 concerning reversion of private hy-
droelectric power plants, my purpose is to display the outer boundaries for
illegal subsidies and the legal and economic implications to the power in-
dustry according to the international law agreement of the EEA. The Nor-
way Reversion Instrument (NRI), the purpose of which is to ensure public
ownership of private power plants at the end of the sixtieth year of conces-
sion, is under scrutiny for receiving illicit state aid. The 2004 Official Nor-
way Report (NOU) 5 claims that public owners of Norwegian hydroelectric
plants, due to immunization from reversion, are subsidized contrary to EEA
* Peter Orebech is professor of law at University of Tromso, Norway.
1. Herbert Ungerer, Deputy Dir. Gen., Directorate Gen. Competition, Eur. Comm'n, Address at
European Competition Day: Which Approach to Competition in Electricity and Gas-Are We Tracking
the Right Issues (May 22, 2008) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2008_15_en.pdf.
2. Peter Orebech, Er hjemfall statsstotte etter EOS-avtalen? [Is the reversion similar to subsidy
according to the EEA agreement?], 121 NORSK OKONOMISK TiDssKRIFT [NORWEGIAN J. ECON.] 55, 55
(2007) (Nor.).
3. 1994 OJ (L 1) 3. 1 [hereinafter EEA Agreement]. This is a market access international agree-
ment between Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway and the EU member states, which entered into force
on January 1, 1994.
4. Case E-2/06, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Nor., EFTA Court of Judgment, June 26, 2007,
available at http://www.eftacourt.int/images/uploads/E-2-06 Judgment.pdf.
5. NORGES OFFENTLIGE UTREDNINGER [OFFICIAL NORWAY REPORT], HJEMFALL [REVERSION]
26 (2004) [hereinafter HJEMFALL].
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Article 61,6 which bans "any aid granted by EC Member States, European
Fair Trade Association (EFTA) states, or through state resources in any
form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by fa-
vouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods" (emphasis
added).7 Thus, national benefit "shall, insofar as it affects trade between
Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agree-
ment." 8 Only minor (de minimis) state aid is acceptable, 9 the initiation of
which leaves little room for national, political manoeuvring. As the EU or
EFTA courts decide de minimis limitations, the EEA/EU countries may not
provide state aid to fuel-free green energy without consensus.
State aid should be read within the framework of the EU Green Certif-
icatesto-also called Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)'1-which initially
should go along with a carbon monoxide tax. 12 As to elements tied togeth-
er, 13 the EU doubts may affect the United Nations (UN) future system on
the UN's international carbon credit registry, the UN's International
Transaction Log (ITL), the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund,14 and the
Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),1 5 but perhaps
6. This is now contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Article
107 [hereinafter EEA Article 61], upon which the EU has decided that "Member States shall introduce
measures effectively designed to ensure that the share of energy from renewable sources equals or
exceeds that shown ... without prejudice to Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty."
7. EEA Agreement, supra note 3, at Art. 61.
8. Id.
9. Case 5/69 Volk v. Vervaceke, 1969 ECR 295.
10. See Council Directive 2009/28/EC OJ (L 140) 16 (EC) (discussing the promotion of the use of
energy from renewable sources. See also, Council Directive 2004/101/EC OJ (L 338/18) (EC) (amend-
ing Council Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading
within the Community); cf EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 16) (2008) (a draft proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 2003/87/EC OJ (L 275/32) (EC)
so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the Community);
see also, Auctioning Regulation-Commission Proposal, EUR. PARL. DOC. (SEC XX) (2010) (an EU
Commission regulation on timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas
emission allowances pursuant to Directive 2003/87),
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/proposed-auctioningreg.pdf.
11. See Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner; The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme:
Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, I REV. OF ENVT. ECON. AND POL'Y 1, 66-68 (2007). For litera-
ture references, see Frank J. Convery; Reflections-The Emerging Literature on Emissions Trading in
Europe, 3 REV. OF ENvT. ECON. AND POL'Y 121, 121-37 (2009).
12. See EU Considers General Carbon Tax, BBC.COM, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
8552604.stm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010); France to Rethink Carbon Tax Plan, BBC.cOM,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2lhileurope/8434505.stm, (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
13. Memorandum from the EU Commission to connect EU with UN carbon credit registry, Aug.
6, 2008, available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article 8072_en.htm.
14. A system of green certificate transmission was however not decided upon. See U.N. Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 7-18, 2009, Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec.
18, 2009).
15. Christie Kneteman and Andrew Green, The Twin Failures of the CDM. Recommendations for
the "Copenhagen Protocol, " 2 LAw & DEV. REV. 129, 129 (2009).
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lessen the United States' system on Renewable Energy Certificates.16 At
present this package seems politically unsalable.17 The EU member states'
unilateral approach is pertinent,' 8 and one cannot know for sure whether
the 2008 draft directive of EU-based trade and registry of an ETS will ever
come into force. Thus, the question here is how can EU/EEA member
states initiate and implement national aid to the benefit of renewable power
without infringing upon the ban against state aid as described in Article 61
of the EEA (now, Article 107 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU))?
It is unclear whether the EU will acknowledge national subsidies to
repair market failure or whether the EU will decide to launch a common
scheme to replace the present member-state-based program of ETS. The
following discussion relates to national state aid to the benefit of fuel-free
energy. The argument that was launched against the NRI, though in vain,
illustrates the unilateral legroom granted to the EU/EEA Member states'
aid: Is the immunity of public owners against the cessation of possession at
the end of the sixty-year concession, according to the 1917 Act, 19 subsidiz-
ing these owners?
Could the EU ban on subsidies possibly hamper the introduction of
fuel-free electricity? The EC Treaty Article 87 (now, Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the EU (TFEU) Article 107 that equals the EEA Article 61 ban
on subsidization) interprets the ban according to the Community guidelines
on state aid for environmental protection. 20 The guideline, which refrains
16. Ken Rudin, "Green" with Anger over Obama's Drilling Plan, NPR BLOG, (March 31, 2010,
10:13am) (noting that President Barrack Obama said March 31, 2010, before the BP catastrophe, that he
will prop up off shore drilling as part of a bipartisan climate bill: "But the bottom line is this: given our
energy needs, in order to sustain economic growth, produce jobs, and keep our businesses competitive,
we're going to need to harness traditional sources of fuel even as we ramp up production of new
sources of renewable, homegrown energy."),
http://www.npr.orgfblogs/politicaljunkie/2010/03/obamagets drilledbyenviros.html.
17. French Government Backs Down on Carbon Plan, BBC.COM,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8583898.stm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
18. The Swedish Green Certificate Programme of Jan. 16, 2003, an act on electricity certificates
for the furtherance of renewable energy, is an excellent example. See Proposition [Prop.] 2002/2003:40
Elcertifikat f6r att frimja fomybara energikiillor: en sammanfattning av regeringens proposition
[government bill] (Swed.).
19. Lov om erver av vannfall m.v. [The Waterfall Regulation Act], 14 Dec. 1917, nr. 50. There is
no immunity in the United States: the municipal owner of power plants are limited by a licensing period
of 50 years. See Federal Power Act of 1920 § 4 (e), 16 U.S.C §§ 791-828 (1920). For example, see
Yuba County Water Agency, Project No. 2246 (May 1, 1968), which is an order by the Federal Power
Commission (since 1977, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) issuing licenses and accepting
surrenders of licenses for Marysville, California, available at http://www.ycwa-
relicensing.com/Initial%20License/License%20-%20FERC%200rders/FERC%200rder/ 20-
%201963%20-%200516%20-%200rder/o20lssuing/20License.pdf.
20. Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection (EC), 2001 OJ (C 37) 3.
Ill2011]
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from defining "state aid," derogates from the treaty obligations. All state
aid, according to the Renewable Sources Electricity Directive Article
3.3(b), 21 must be interpreted in light of TFEU Article 107. Accordingly, the
EU decided that "Member States shall introduce measures effectively de-
signed to ensure that the share of energy from renewable sources equals or
exceeds that shown. . . without prejudice to Articles 87 and 88 of the Trea-
ty." 22 Does the subsidy restriction hamper the transition from "black" to
"green" energy?
I. THE SUSTAINABLE "WHITE COAL" OF NORWAY
Hydroelectric power is clean and highly valued in times of rising
greenhouse gas emissions and its seeming devastation to the environ-
ment. 23 Norway, a country of 4.8 million inhabitants and 382,000 square
kilometres in Northern Europe, 24 produced 143,172 gigawatt hours (GWh)
in 2008 and 133,412 GWh in 2009, of which 140,901 GWh (2008) and
127,530 GWh (2009) were from hydroelectric power.25 Only 1,320 GWh
(2008) and 4,936 GWh (2009) were from fuel (coal, gas or oil). In 2008,
98.5 percent of Norway's power produced was hydroelectric power. While
the consumption of electric power in 2008 was 129,144 GWh, it was
125,213 GWh in 2009, which is a reduction of three percent. 26 The net
export of power was 14,033 GWh (2008) and 12,199 GWh (2009).27 The
publicly owned electricity companies produced eighty-eight percent of the
total GWh in Norway (2004).28
21. Council Directive 2009/28/EC, supra note 10, at 103.
22. Id.
23. For a criticism of climate models, see T.N. Chase et al., Likelihood of rapidly increasing
surface temperatures unaccompanied by strong warming in the free troposphere, 25 CLIMATE RES.
185-90 (2004) and Phillip Stott, Global Warming: The Collapse of a Grand Narrative, CLAMOUR OF
THE TIMES ("[tihe Copenhagen Conference could prove to be the beginning of the end for the Global
Warming Grand Narrative") available at
http://web.mac.com/sinfonial/ClamourOfTheTimes/ClamourOf TheTimeslEntries/2010/1/30_GI
obalWarming:_the Collapse-of a GrandNarrative.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 1 do not pick up
on this debate.
24. Facts and Figures, NORWARY.ORG, http://www.norway.org/aboutnorway/ (last visited Oct.
25, 2010).
25. Id. In 2008, Japan had 126.8 million inhabitants and produced 1015.2 TWh. See U.S. Energy
Info. Admin., Japan Energy Profile, http://www.eia.doe.gov/country/countryenergydata.cfin?fips-JA
(last visited Nov. 28, 2010). In 2007, Norway had 4.8 million inhabitants and produced 135 TWh. See
World Factbook, http://www.nationmaster.com/country/no-norway/ene-energy (last visited Nov. 28,
2010). Accordingly, Norway produces about four times more electricity per capita than Japan.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Elektrisitetsstatistikk 2002-04, SSB.NO,
http://www.ssb.no/emner/10/08/10/elektrisitetaar/arkiv/tab-2006-07-27-13.html (last visited Oct. 25,
2010).
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Increased power production throughout the liberalization period 1989-
2002 (from 119,197 to 130,473 GWh) 29 did not hinder the rising en gros
price in Norway (from three to four cents). Price (index adjusted average)
to consumer increased from eight cents (1997) to nine cents (2002), even
though Norway's consumption flattened out, increasing only slightly from
35,512 GWh inl994 to 36,111 GWh in 2002.30 Simultaneously, the spot
price increased from two cents (20 terawatt hours (TWh) in 1995) to six
cents (113 TWh in 2003).31 While the price increased three times, a six-
fold increase in traded electricity was the result. From 1992 to 2003 the
export price for Norwegian electricity increased from one cent to six cents
per kilowatt hour. 32
This discussion relates to the competitive advantage of Norwegian
electricity. As a starting point, one could say that such a competitive advan-
tage is consistent with the best of green energy politics, since 98.5 percent
is fuel-free hydroelectric power. Why invoke competition law infringe-
ments against the Norwegian power production sector? According to EU
competition law, subsidies are measured by the effects, not the intentions.33
The 2004 NOU hypothesizes that reversion immunity for municipal owners
is illegal because the reversion "distorts or threatens to distort competi-
tion."34 The competition is related to the electricity price as noted in the
market, which "affects trade between the contracting parties." 35 According-
ly, immunity for municipalities should by "the very circumstances in which
the aid is granted" 36 threaten to distort competition in the market place,
which is the Nord Pool. Do private producers face a reduced competitive
position in the market due to NRI?
The 2004 NOU states that market price results from gross margin cal-
culations, upon which even slight cost variance between private and com-
munal power plants are conclusive; this view is inconsistent with the fact
29. Elektrisitetsstatistikk 1989-2002, SSB.NO,
http://www.ssb.no/emner/10/08/10/elektrisitetaar/tab-2004-06-28-01.html, (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
30. Elektrisitetsstatistikk 1965-2002, SSB.NO,
http://www.ssb.no/emner/10/08/10/elektrisitetaar/tab-2004-06-28-15.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
3 1. Elektrisitetsstatistikk 1995-2004, SSB.No,
http://www.ssb.no/emner/10/08/10/elektrisitetaar/tab-2004-06-28-26.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
32. Elektrisitetsstatistikk 1973-2003, SSB.NO,
http://www.ssb.no/emner/10/08/10/elektrisitetaar/tab-2004-06-28-25.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
33. Jo SHAW, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 334-35,457 (3d ed. 2000).
34. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 103.
35. Id. at 244.
36. Joined Cases 296 & 318/82, Leeuwardener Papierenfabriek v. Comm'n of the European
Communities 1985 ECR 809, 824.
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that market price is "supply- and demand-driven." 37 Electricity is a perfect-
ly homogenous commodity. If the market price as of today exceeds the cost
margin, even for producers affected by reversion, the competitive strength
of private and public producers is almost equal. In this situation, no lack of
margin hinders private producers from selling electricity at a lower price
than the one charged by Statskraft or municipal power companies. The
2004 committee concern relates to the lack of foreign investment, "due to
minor attractiveness," which failed to adapt to several of the takeover
bids. 38 Because electricity pricing is unaffected by the possessors of shares,
this is irrelevant when subsidization is under investigation. I do not consid-
er this side of the problem.
As statistics indicate, the price trend is up much more than pre-
dicted;39 there are no shrinking margins for power producers. Despite that a
publicly owned company may "optimize its investment decisions," minor
differences are offset by increases in markets as well as the shift from cost-
and gross-margin calculations to the principle of sales, which satisfies the
corporate economic prescription of "drawing from the market what the
market can pay."40 Thus one cannot conclude that the NRI has contributed
to "the hampering of entry of new companies into the market." 4 1 Regard-
less of the subsidy, the existence of which is but one of the critical cumula-
tive conditions, the illicit subsidy should result in distortion of the
electricity trade.
While undeveloped waterfalls are owned by the owner of the land
over which the water is running, the NRI system created by the Waterfall
Regulation Act of 1917 introduced public ownership of power plants at the
end of a sixty-year concession period. This kind of taking is not protected
by the constitutional rule of compensation for expropriation (eminent do-
main). Legally speaking, this is a compulsory succession of power plants to
the public, free of charge. However, if so preferred by the original owner
and acknowledged by the national state of Norway, the power plants are
37. For a general approach to modem business, see OTrO KOPPIUS & ERIC VAN HECK; SUPPLY
AND DEMAND DRIVEN COORDINATION IN SMART BUSINESS NETWORKS (Springer 2005).
38. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 71. The Finnish Power Company Fortum takeover bid (4.1 billion
NOK or approximately 720 million USD) for the Oslo-owned electricity company, Hafslund, was
accepted in 2004, but not completed. See Hafslund pd vei fil Finland?,
http://e24.no/arkiv/article541556.ece (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
39. Aftenposten (Oslo) 6 August 2005: The EU og ESA investigates the electricity price devel-
opment. In Great Britain however it is predicted that free trade results in lower prices. See Ian Byatt,
Europe's Directive on Services must not be Diluted, FIN. TIMES 15 (Sept. 12, 2005).
40. The codification of which was actually proposed in 2002. See Dok nr. 8:99 (draft law by MP
Norwegian Storting, Oystein Hedstrom [Changing the competition law, new § 3-12]).
41. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 103.
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leased back according to market-based calculations. Due to high develop-
ment costs, sunlight, wind, tide, and wave energies fail to compete in tradi-
tional hydroelectric markets. Because Norwegian hydroelectric power is
both superfluous and inexpensive, as statistics indicate, the market mechan-
ism does not suffice in the case of fuel-free electricity development. Thus,
national state aid is needed. In the case of tradable quotas, an initial public
regulation is needed, namely, the introduction of compulsory purchases of
certificates. All power companies' portfolios should include Green Certifi-
cates. 42 However, is the system of compulsory purchase nothing but an
undisclosed subsidy? If this is the case, such a finding is problematic. 43
II. THE BACKDROP: THE VICTORY OF DEREGULATION
The Commission remains convinced that customers are best served by
moving forward to complete the transition of the wholesale power busi-
ness to competition.-Pat Wood III44
Until the end of the 1980s, the development of waterfalls, power
plants, high voltage transmission lines, etc. was mainly a public commit-
ment. The Norwegian Energy Act of 1990 introduced, however, an era of
liberalization, 45 the result of which was outsourcing the work of national
state agencies that earlier had developed, built, and managed the infrastruc-
tures.46 Further, hydroelectric power plants were unleashed from their re-
42. The compulsory system was proposed in Norway, but due to unsuccessful negotiations with
Sweden and domestic opposition, the proposed system was not implemented. See St. prp. nr. 1 § 7.4,
Tilriding fra Olje- og energidepartementet av 10 september 2004 [Recommendation from the Ministry
of Petroleum and Energy of 10 September 2004] (Nor.). In Sweden, however, the certificate market was
implemented May 1, 2004. See Proposition [Prop.] 2002/2003:40 Elcertifikat for att franija fomybara
energikallor: en sammanfattning av regeringens proposition [Electricity certificates to promote renewa-
ble energy] [government bill] (Swed.).
43. There has been some criticism. See, e.g., Petter Haugneland, Grent sertifikatmarked kan gi
mindre gronn elektrisitet [A Green Certificate Market May Result in Less Green Electricity], 1
CICERONE 16, 16 (2004) (Nor.) (interview with Eirik Schroder Amundsen), available at
http://www.cicero.io.no/fulltext /indexe.aspx?id=2722.
44. Comprehensive National Energy Policy, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Energy and Air
Quality, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 40 (2003) (statement of Hon. Patrick Wood III,
Chairman, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n).
45. Lov om produksjon, omforming, overfering,m omsetning og fordeling og bruk av energi m.m.
[Act on the production, conversion, transfer, sale, distribution and use of energy etc.], 29 juni 1990 nr.
50 (Nor.), translated in Translated Norwegian legislation, at http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-
19900629-050-eng.pdf [hereinafter 1990 Energy Act].
46. In 1992, Statkraftverkene (state-owned power stations, formerly part of Vassdrags- og elektri-
sitet vesen [Water Resources and Energy Agency]), was split into two companies: Statnett (owner of
cables and high voltage net selling transmission rights for power plants), and Statkraft (producer of




sponsibilities for local delivery, price regulation, and monopolies. 47 The
victory of deregulation introduces antitrust 48 and competition law.49
Among the new challenges is how to balance the need for state aid to pro-
ducers of fuel-less energy with the volatile situation of competition law and
accusations of illicit subsidies. According to the 1990 Energy Act, the
transmission of both low and high voltage energy was separated from elec-
tricity sales.50 Thus, a cable company bills consumers for the power line
connection both a fixed and a variable price. The electricity delivered is
measured by an electric meter. The state-owned companies "Statnett"
(Norway) and "Affhrsverket Svenska Kraftndt" (Sweden) are in charge of
the high voltage transmission. Due to prices gaps between Scandinavia and
Europe, subsea cables are laid, according to national power company
agreements, called "merchant transmission," 51 across the North Sea from
Norway to the UK 52 and the NetherlandS53 and across the Baltic Sea from
Sweden to Germany. 54
In 1993 the Nord Pool ASA was established for the purpose of trading
electricity, derivates, futures, forward contracts, and call options and for the
offering of clearing services. All national and foreign companies traded
electricity or derivates at the exchange. Enron operated at the Nord Pool,
and its failure caused sky-high electricity prices in Oslo. The turmoil
caused by the Enron bankruptcy resulted in the creation of the subsidiary
Nord Pool Spot AS (2002), the function of which is to trade physical elec-
tricity only. At present, the derivates, clearing services, and the yet-to-come
"Green Certificates" are the sole responsibility of the Nord Pool ASA. Un-
til 2002, the demand for electricity by derivate traders resulted in high pres-
sure on spot prices; however, since the splitting of derivates and the
physical electricity in 2002, this is no longer a problem.
By the time of the 1990 Energy Act and Norway's membership to the
EEA on May 2, 1992, the EU's "four freedoms"-non-discrimination and
47. For a discussion of the situation in the United States, see FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY,
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 626-31 (3d ed. 2010).
48. For an American law and economics perspective, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW
(2d ed. 2001).
49. For a general account of European Union competition law, see BELLAMY & CHILD:
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF COMPETITION (Peter Roth & Vivien Rose eds., 6th ed. 2008).
50. 1990 Energy Act, §§ 4-6, 4-7.
51. These civil law "merchant transmission agreements" should not be confused with inter-states
agreements as in the United States; for a discussion of these see id at 933-35.
52. National Grid and Statnett Explore Linking the UK and Norwegian Electricity Grids (Oct. 6,
2009), http://www.nationalgrid.com/ uk/Media+Centre/PressReleases/2009/06.10.09.htm.
53. TenneT and Statnett Sign Agreement (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.tennet.org/english/
projects/news/tennet enstatnetttekenen overeenkomst.aspx.
54. Welcome to Baltic Cable, http://www.balticcable.com/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
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zero subsidization-had been introduced, and electrical power was now a
free-trade commodity.55 Thus, Norwegian hydroelectric power potentially
had 490 million new European Union customers. While competition on
equal footing should bring electricity prices down and speed up the expor-
tation of hydroelectric power, the completely dysfunctional transmission
networks throughout Europe create a technical barrier, 56 a problem in need
of a solution. 57
Legal barriers make the situation even worse.58 The "green power
wave" scheme for subsidising renewable energy (mostly windmills) has
swept over Scandinavia. The stated goal is to swap coal-fired power with
fuel-less energy. Since hydroelectric power already produces 98.5 percent
of electricity in Norway, there is much discussion as to whether Norwegian
consumers should pay for the Green Certificates forced upon domestic
hydroelectric power companieS59 because national subsidies will end up
abroad, resulting in minimal positive domestic effects.60 Why should Nor-
wegians pay for the elimination of coal fired plants in Europe? 61
The certificates are distributed for free to power companies that pro-
duce renewable electricity. The certificate's income is accumulated by
forced sales to existing producers, which results in subsidization of new
production. The scheme is necessary due to gaps in production costs. While
hydroelectric power is inexpensive (the production cost is one cent per
kWh), windmill electricity costs at least ten times more. By forcing certifi-
55. Agreement on the European Economic Area, Arts. 1, 61, & 69, Jan. 3, 1994,
http://www.efta.int/-/media/Documents/legal-texts/eealthe-eea-
agreement/Main%20Text%20of/ 2Othe%20Agreement/EEAagreement.ashx [hereinafter EEA Agree-
ment].
56. Similar problems occur in the United States. See, for example, the illustration of transmission
congestion in New York. BOSSELMAN, supra note 47, at 931-33.
57. See id at 933. Section 216 of the Federal Power Act, added in 2005, gives the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission some leverage where states disagree about transmission line locations.
58. See id. at 893. Many countries are considering renewable electricity standards that would
apply uniformly throughout the country.
59. Id. at 905. In a large entity like the EU or the United States, the availability of renewable
resources may vary greatly from region to region; those regions which lack such availability may have
opposing views from those regions where renewable sources are abundant.
60. Similar concerns have been raised in the United States. According to Steven Hayward, "poli-
cymakers should regard with skepticism claims of net new jobs in the energy sector that depend on
subsidies or mandates. Ironically there is an economic term for such policies: unsustainable." Growing
U.S. Trade in Green Technology, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection, Comm. On Energy and Commerce, Illth Cong. (October 7, 2009) (testimony of Steven F.
Hayward, F.IC Weyerhaeuser Fellow in Law and Economics, American Enterprise Institute),
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20091007/haywardtestimony.pdf.
61. See Torstein Bye & Michael Hoel, Grenne sertifikater-dyr og formblslos fornybar moro
[Green certificates-expensive and purposeless renewable fun], 7 SAMFUNNSOKONOMEN [THE




cates upon existing power companies, the hydroelectric cost is increased,
which in turn, raises the market price of electricity for domestic consump-
tion in Norway. As certificates are in the run-up to become EU policy, 62
national measures contradict bans on national state subsidies. 63 The bound-
ary of illegal state aid is studied in the EFTA court's NRI case, 64 in which
the Norwegian state-owned (48 percent) company of Norsk Hydro chal-
lenged Norway before the EFTA Surveillance Agency (ESA).
III. IS IMMUNITY FROM REVERSION A STATE AID AND REVERSION A
SUBSIDY-WAIVER?
The following law and economics study is related to the subsidization
effects of the unique Norway reversion system, a specific regime that was
introduced by the Parliament (Storting) in 1909 and found its final shape in
1917.65 This illustration relates to illicit subsidization in general and also to
the advance of new fuel-free energy.
What has reversion to do with state aid? Subsidization is not limited to
pecuniary aid; the concept includes "State resources in any form whatso-
ever." 66 In short, all kinds of exemptions from general legal or pecuniary
obligations may affect competition and help improve the situation for par-
ticipating companies. Accordingly, in theory, public owned power compa-
nies-which exist due to the exemption-are the beneficiaries of
subsidization.
Does electricity trade suffer from distorted competition because of the
discriminatory NRI? Is a state- or municipally-owned, reversion-free power
plant-due to this exemption-favored by a state subsidy at the end of year
sixty? The 2004 NOU's position-based on the advice of the committee's
EEA expert-is that amendments to the reversion rules should reverse and
equalize concessions to private companies with those of public companies
in accordance with competition laws.67 ESA does not share that position
because ESA did not, at the time of the writ nor under the subsequent
62. EU Directive 2004/101/, at 18. To date, only Denmark, Sweden and Finland have imple-
mented the system.
63. For a discussion of EU Competition Directorate practice through 1992, see Peter Orebech,
GATT-rett, EOS-rett eller EF-rett? [GATT-law, EEA-law or EU-law?] (Oslo 1992) (Nor.).
64. See The Norsk Hydro is lobbying in Brussels at the EFTA Surveillance Authority for the
Purpose of Challenging the Norwegian Reversion Instrument, NORWEGIAN NEWS AGENCY (NTB),
April 27, 2006 (Nor.) (on file with author).
65. The historical background for the reversion system is presented in EFTA Case E-2/06, at
I 13-20.
66. EEA Agreement, Art. 61.1.
67. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 20.
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EFTA court proceedings, articulate any doubt about the matter of illegal
subsidies.68 The NOU claims that ESA's failure to bring up subsidization
during the case does not imply anything about the ESA position with re-
gard to the legality of the NRI. 69 To the contrary, the NOU position is that
the ESA may raise the state aid objection at a later point.70
Because ESA failed to challenge the NRI as a form of illicit state aid,
one view is that Norsk Hydro's attack on the NRI is nothing but a Direct
Unproductive Profit-seeker (DUP) strategy (i.e., a strategy to gain windfall
profit at the end of the sixtieth year of possession). While private losses are
total due to the compensation-free reversion benefitting the Norwegian
state, the public gain is tremendous. As previously mentioned, distortion of
competition is illegal only "so far as it affects trade between Contracting
Parties."71 Thus, internal distortion is exempt from the regulation. The
other limitation is that concessions for power plants older than January 1,
1994 (the date that the EEA entered into force) are exempt from the EEA
regime.
There are loopholes in the system. A counterbalancing tax or econom-
ic rent may offset state aid in relation to Article 61. Another escape is to
waive the compulsory sellout by the sixtieth year of production or to sell
out the plant before the reversion. In this article, however, I do not consider
these issues.
A. Immunity from Reversion as Subsidy:
The Views of the 2004 Committee
[E]fficiency is determined on the heroic assumption that a dollar is worth
the same to everybody. This is what is called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,
potential Pareto efficiency, or wealth maximization. Although efficiency
so defined cannot be considered the sole or a comprehensive measure of
social welfare, it is an important component of social welfare and. . .
probably the only one that the antitrust laws can do much to promote.
-Richard A. Posner 72
68. EFTA Case E-2/06, at Mf 54-90.
69. HIEMFALL, supra note 5, at 229 (EEA legal assessment of the reversion department).
70. These procedural questions are not debated here; however, the view of legal scholars is that
because ESA did not react during the 2007 case, the objection is now barred. See H.P. Graver & U.
Sverdrup, ESA-mer katolsk enn paven [ESA-more Catholic than the Pope] 6 (Arena Working Paper
WP 02/11, April 8, 2002) (ESA Reasoned Opinion gives the "final position on the violation"),
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2002/papers/wp02_1 1.htm.
71. EEA Agreement, Art. 61.1.
72. POSNER, supra note 48, at 23.
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The 2004 NOU assertion is that the reversion clause in power conces-
sions is affecting "the market competition for electrical power." 73 The pri-
vate beneficiary is accountable for the "transfer of considerable economic
values to the national state" at the end of the sixtieth year. 74 This implies
that the "government is renouncing revenues" in relation to the publicly
owned plants, which is a qualification criterion for the state aid. 75 If state
aid results in competitive advantages, it is sufficient to document that the
addressees to the aid are engaged in trans-boundary trade to construe the
illegality of the scheme. 76 Thus, reversion to the disadvantage of the pri-
vate industry results in economic gains for publicly owned companies.77 In
case of difficulties in establishing new power producing companies, such
negative impact demonstrates illegal state aid. 78 In theory, public industries
may optimize their investment strategies in such a manner as private actors
are prohibited, which results in distortion of competition.79 This produces
inefficiency because power plants may achieve seemingly satisfactory re-
sults, despite inefficient resource use, because the economic rent is financ-
ing inefficient management or unprofitable investments.80 Because
economic theory states that efficient producers are willing to pay the most,
the NOU view is that free market adaptation in the energy sector will result
in an economically viable distribution of the production capacity. However,
this view does not consider efficiency. 8' No questions are asked about why
efficiency is important. 82 The crux of the matter is that the NOU simply
defends the "identical framework condition" to all competitorS83 and as-
sumes the present concession law implies that public actors pay more than
private actors for the same block of stock. Thus, legal differences prevent
efficient actors from taking control. 84
73. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 233.
74. Id. at 229.
75. Id
76. Id. at 234.
77. Id. at 235.
78. Id. at 233.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 70-71.
81. POSNER, supra note 48, at. 23.
82. See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for a New Religion, 116
HARv. L. REv 1229, 1246 (2003) ("Rather than achieving increased efficiencies and improved options,
then, the privatization process risks reduced quality, unequal treatment, and outright corruption. Priva-
tized programs. . . can be grouped. . . (a) dilution of public values, (b) potential mismatch between
competition and social provision, and (c) dangers of divisiveness and loss of common institutions").
83. HJEMFALL, supra n. 5, at 19.
84. Id. at 71.
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The 2004 committee focus, however, is not the electricity market, but
instead, the market for power plants.85 They believe that rules of reversion
oust private competitors. The NOU states that private and public conces-
sionaires operate in a market which crisscrosses Norwegian borders. Con-
sequently, the trading criteria in Article 61 are satisfied.86 This is an
oversimplification. To reach a conclusion on the disadvantages that can be
anticipated by the private and foreign investor, we need to consider poten-
tial investors' frames of reference.
B. Interpretations of the Norwegian Reversion Instrument and State Aid
My position is that the subsidization claim by the 2004 committee is unten-
able and does not carry. The purpose of this section is to argue the case of
the Norwegian Reversion Instrument (NRI) in light of the 2004 NOU
committee views. My position, both primarily and alternatively, renders
possible a national leeway to fuel-free energy policies, hereunder subsidi-
zation, within the EEA frames. The main question is whether NRI is illegal
state aid according to EEA Article 61(1). Legal validity fails only if all of
the prerequisites are infringed. The test requires that (1) one of the EFTA-
states provide the illicit state aid, (2) it is taken from governmental funding
of whatever character, 87 (3) it is selective and does not reach out to all pro-
ducers, (4) it distorts the competition, and (5) it affects inter-state trade.88
The NOU committee considers that the five cumulative conditions are
fulfilled. 89 Accordingly, the NOU position is that in its present form, the
NRI is illegal state aid.90
The concept of state aid relates both to the remittent (the state that is
providing support) and the receiver (the beneficial industry). The subsidy
should result in a burden corresponding to the national state similar to the
benefit provided to the industry. My position is that this justification is
insufficient due to the imperfect discretion on cross border implications.
The following discussion related to the interpretation of Article 61(1)
attempts to answer two main questions: What is the situation of the national
state providing the aid? And how does the reversion immunity influence
municipally-owned power companies?
85. Id. at 77.
86. Id at 234, 240.
87. Id. at 232-34.
88. Id. at 234.
89. Id. at 230.
90. Id. at 235.
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1. Price-setting as a Result from Production Cost
A basic principle of corporate economics is to draw from markets
what markets are willing to pay. The gross profit calculations 9' are left
behind to the benefit of optimal point of cost and income combined ("the
market-extract principle"). It is common wisdom that in a "Nordic or North
European market, different producers using different techniques will occur,
Norwegian hydroelectric power is typically low cost production compared
with thermal electricity from other countries." 92 Given this fact, how could
the NRI really distort competition?
According to a now long-gone system, only moderate gross profit was
appropriate; here, the starting point was trade usage, 93 and if no such cus-
tom existed, the solution was a percentage increase in price, not a dollar
markup. 94 The common profit level was stipulated at thirty percent, the
maximum profit referred to in Section 24 of the 1953 Act (repealed in
1990).95
The crux of the matter is how to consider the process of price determi-
nation? As a reminder, the importance of this answer is in investigating the
possible distortion of competition due to the NRI in the process of selling
electricity. The 2004 committee insists that prices result from gross profit-
calculation, which implicitly follows from the popular view that take over
by the most efficient producer will result in a cheaper price for consum-
ers. 96 If production cost drops, the consumer price drops as well. The gains
from improved and more efficient production result in consumer benefits.
Spelling out such confusion, one cannot easily understand the motivation
for outsourcing productions input to low-cost countries, such as Latvia,
India, or China.
Even less flattering for the 2004 committee is the lack of insight into
basic principles of competition law of the EU/EEA "internal market." 97
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) blocks cost-based prices. Conse-
91. Traditionally, this was the legally regulated method of calculation, according to the Act on
Control on Prices and Competition of June 26, 1953, No. 4 (repealed in 1993), which states, "[p]rice on
electricity in Norway is mainly stipulated by long trade contracts based on historical data mirroring the
development cost." See Norsk Energi Og EFs indre marked [Rapport], Oslo: Arbeidsgruppen for
energispersmAl 28 (1990).
92. HJEMFALL, supra n. 5, at 198.
93. KNUT BLOM: PRISLOVEN, MED KOMMENTAR [PRICING LAW, A COMMENTARY] 77 (1954).
94. Id.
95. TORSTEIN ECKHOFF & 0YSTEIN GJELSVIK, PRISLOVEN Av 26 JUNI 1953: MED
KOMMENTARER [PRICING LAW: A COMMENTARY] 107 (1955).
96. See HJEMFALL, supra n. 5, at 71.
97. PETER OREBECH, EOS-avtalens artikkel 125 [EEA Agreement, Article 125], in LoV OG RETT
26-45 (2006) (emphasizing the 2004 NOU committee's discussion of reversion).
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quently, hydroelectric power contracts are no longer available at a low
cost-based calculation, but shall follow the market price.98 Cheap electrici-
ty for Norwegian energy-intensive industries (like aluminum) is illegal
subsidization. 99
2. Have Purchaser's Lost Investment Strength?
Solving conflicts through law requires both interpretative ability and
real-life insight. My position is that the 2004 committee fails to come to
grips with the living fabric of life. The focus here is dejure discrimination
due to different treatment under the NRI. Is it possible to say that the rever-
sion scheme is hampering the establishment of new businesses? 00
The position taken by the 2004 committee is based on subsequent in-
cidents (occurring sixty years after the original purchase) and the fact that
concessions are relevant for this purchase. Thus, the committee is discount-
ing a distant economic difference to today's value by the net present worth
method, which cannot be done because the method assumes that the inves-
tor, at the time of the investment, actually has taken such deliberation into
consideration. This is dubious as differences between public and private
investors cannot really be seen as both optimized investments and, even
more important, long-term investments (everything that is not day trading).
What are the differences all about? The 2004 committee claims that
the EEA requires like treatment and identical framework conditions for all
persons acquiring ownership rights to hydro-electric power plants.'o' In
theory, the discrimination against private investors blocks such investment.
This conclusion is, however, undocumented.
To come to grips with this position, a comparison of the investor
groups of foreign power plant owners and the Norwegian actors is neces-
sary. Initially, there is an obvious difference. Foreign power companies
enjoy investment gains without the burden of reversion. Their capital
strength is unaffected by the NRI since Norway is the only country encum-
bered with such burdens. The ramification of NRI investment hindrance is
exclusively Norwegian, and there is no disadvantage to foreign investors
whose portfolio consists of only foreign positions.
98. Phasing out cheap electricity contracts to domestic industries resulted in Statskraft additional
income of approximately $80 million (U.S.) in 2005 increasing to $450 million (U.S.) by 2012 if price
is steady on five cents per kWh. See Europower 10 (March 2005).
99. EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No. 148/04/COL (2004).
100. See HIEMFALL, supra n. 5, at 233.
101. Id.at7l.
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Looking at the present electricity production and investment, the 2004
committee has refrained from producing either arguments or documenta-
tion to the anticipated differences. The committee's view is that discrimina-
tion is a random consequence of the different regimes. As seen by the facts
and discussion, this is, at best, an inaccuracy: there are differences between
a first purchase of untouched waterfalls and the purchase of "going con-
cern" power plants and a situation of a block-of-stock acquisition.
3. Does the Law Influence the EEA Trade?
Has Norwegian reversion policy illegally infringed upon the EEA
electricity trade? According to the 2004 committee, "the termination of the
NRI would result in a general ease of the burden to the framework of the
electricity sector,"102 This means that the NRI does not imply a financial
support at all, but, to the contrary, a financial burden that is affecting Nor-
way alone. Accordingly, as I fully adhere to the 2004 committee here, my
primary position is that the NRI is detrimental to the Norwegian private
power industry in particular and to the entire industry in general. Thus, the
conclusion that a general subsidy benefitting the Norwegian power industry
results from the reversion is out of question.
In the alternative and despite my conclusion in the preceding para-
graph, if the NRI is a benefit for the Norwegian power industry, is it sub-
sidization according to the five above-listed prerequisites? The importance
of this discussion is not the state aid to Norwegian hydroelectric power in
particular, but in scrutinizing possible, future objections against state aid to
all kinds of fuel-free electricity production.
My starting point is that the 2004 committee confuses the electricity
market with the market for shares in power companies. The provisions on
investment rights across borders that govern the market for shares in power
companies (EEA Article 40) are dissimilar to those related to the free flow
of commodities (EEA Article 8-26), such as electrical power. Our topic is
distortion of trade due to state aid, not discrimination in investment rights.
Article 61(1) relates to commodities only, not to the right to investment.
Secondly, even though a better competitive position may result from a
reversion-free system, such considerations are superfluous to the discussion
because, under Article 61, the purpose is not to establish the perfect market,
but to prevent national states from illicit competitive conditions vis-a-vis
foreign competitors. Clearly, a few bidders in an atomized market often
have the result of market mismatches, but that problem only occurs under
102. Id. at 82.
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Articles 53 and 54. In relation to this discussion, the presence of competi-
tion and satisfactory margins of profit is sufficient. Under this presumption,
even private power companies which are under the reversion scheme may
reduce kWh prices and still enjoy profitable terms. Thus, Article 61, which
concerns "any aid . .. which distorts or threatens to distort competition"103
does not impact the legality of the NRI. Since margins are high, tiny differ-
ences in costs do not ruin the legality of a discriminatory NRI.
4. The Governmental Burden
How should the NRI be classified? Does legislation prescribe the dia-
chronic reach of private possessions to waterfalls and installations (i.e., the
private law issue of successive passage of real estate)? If so, it follows-as
the concept is "any aid granted" 04-that a condition for indirect subsidies
should be that the public loss of income caused by immunity from rever-
sion directly affects public economy. "Public regulation of a private con-
tractual relationship, which subsequently leads to possible loss of tax
income, is as a starting point, excluded from the subsidization rules." 105
Before classifying the regulation of the NRI, a reminder is necessary.
There is an assumption that immunity from reversion for municipal owners
is a benefit, which, if prerequisites are satisfied, is illicit state aid (my alter-
native position). As reversion is legally binding and operative by the trans-
action of private plants to the national state, one condition for the illegal
state aid conclusion is the existence of an actual burden to the provider of
the aid (i.e., the national state).
"Public funding" includes not only governmental but also municipal
investments. As a consequence, internal circulation of public funding
seems to follow competition rules; it is clearly not a transfer of assets from
the public sector to the private. However, such a view is an oversimplifica-
tion. One objection might be that Article 61(1) is relevant if municipalities
are "going private" and, thus, taking up a trade or business. Having such a
function, communal companies are also under the state aid ban. This puz-
zle, however, will not be discussed here.
An underlying assumption is that communal power plants are exempt
from the state-aid charge because the NRI is only a private law regulation;
it simply governs the private property of waterfalls. However, is reversion a
private law prescription of property ownership reaching jurisdictione ra-
103. EEA Article 61, supra note 6.
104. Id.
105. B.E. HANSEN, AVGIFTSFRITAK OG FORHOLDET TIL STATSSTOTIEREGLENE I EOS-AVTALEN
[IMMUNITY FROM TAXES AND THE RELATION TO STATE AID PROVISIONS IN THE EEA] 60 (2004).
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tione temporis? How do we classify the reversion rule? How do we assess
reversion? Does it prescribe the rights and duties of the first generation of
developers and the original waterfall owner?
The reversion system entitlement was enacted in Section 2, Point 4 of
the 1917 Act on Manufacture Concessions 106 and Section 10, point 4 of the
Waterfall Regulation Act of 1917. Concessions granted relate to "waterfall
possessions," but also to "partial right of use." The latter act relates to "wa-
tercourse regulation concession" required by private developers only. "Re-
version is the right which is afforded to the national state at the end of the
concession period to claim the private plant transferred to the state, without
compensation."l107 The beneficiary is liable for onerous conditions that are
affixed to the concession.108 Technically speaking, the reversion provisions
transfer private power plants to the public. Legally speaking, reversion is
introducing a sixty-year time limit for private possessions (i.e., a qualified
permission to become owner of a waterfall or a power plant). Local and
regional municipalities are exempt from the NRI, the result of which is a
governmental loss of income. Immunity from reversion possibly results in
"loss of income" for the state. Thus, is indirect aid granted?
5. Resulting Benefit for Local Communities
Assuming that reversion is not ruled by private contract law, alterna-
tive discussions include whether state aid is distributed to electricity market
competitors and whether it distorts or threatens to distort cross-border
competition. An absolute requirement is that state aid has a negative impact
upon electricity price. The sales policy of communal companies thus causes
distortion to interstate purchases. If not, no breach to EEA Article 61(1) is
present. The causal connection clause is unclear to the 2004 committee. 0 9
Referring to the Leuwardener case,110 the committee assumes that "aid
granted" directly equals distortion of competition. However, the notion of
"threatens to distort" requires a causation analysis. In Leuwardener, the
court justifies its position by pointing at "the very circumstances in which
106. Industrikonsesjonslov [Acts Relating to the Energy and Water Resources Sector in Norway]
No. 16 (Dec. 14, 1917).
107. KR.FR. BROGGER, LoV OG RETY: NORSK JURIDISK OG RETTSOKONOMISK PPPSLAGSBOK
UTGITr I A-JOUR-FORT FORM [LAW AND RIGHT: NORWEGIAN LEGAL AND ECONOMIC BOOK OF
REFERENCE] 386 (1951).
108. See PETER OREBECH, INSTITUTT FOR STATSRETT OG FOLKERETr: STENSILSERIE NR. 5 40
(1975) (on the administrative law limits to such coercive conditions).
109. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 233.




the aid is granted,"I' which in itself is convincing documentation for the
actual trade distortion. In regards to Norway and Nord Pool trading, the
present financial differences should result in interstate trade distortion. This
is, however, not the case, simply because the NRI is detrimental to Nor-
way's power industry and clearly not beneficial overall.
The 2004 committee's confusion was possibly caused by considering
the difficulties in the establishment of new power companies.11 2 However,
such a criterion is not part of Article 61(1) and should not be considered
under any circumstances. I therefore conclude that the committee failed to
show that the reversion scheme is a subsidy.
6. Who Loses Out on the Subsidization?
Again, this is an alternative discussion; the presumption is that rever-
sion influences interstate trade. However, this is insufficient because prere-
quisites are cumulative. The application of jurisdictione ratione personae
also needs consideration. According to Article 61(1), only those benefit-
ting from the "state aid" are subjected to investigation for breach of the
subsidy prohibition.
The public power plants are accused of receiving a special benefit, i.e.,
illicit state aid. Here, I exclude instances of compensation paid to private
owners because they are not discriminatory to the private producers.
The relevance of EEA Article 61(1) depends upon how the price of
electricity is calculated in real life. As documented in the NOU, the operat-
ing cost per kilowatt hour is less than 0.5 cents. If the price reduction of
electricity by 25 percent resulting from the praised efficiency gains of
competition would result in a price cut of 0.10 cents, what are the dramatic
effects? There are none in particular because the efficiency goal of the
2004 committee counts close to nothing in relation to the sale price (which
is, on average, eleven cents).
The cost of capital is mainly dictated by the investment costs and the
payment of interest on the power plant rather than from the concrete organ-
ization of the power production.11 3 According to generally accepted ac-
counting principles, the capital ownership, as such, should yield interest or
"a profit ... that is at least as good as the one achieved if the capital is
placed in alternative projects."ll 4 Consequently, these considerations show
that regardless of capacity, the production cost per kWh is almost at the
111. Id.
112. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 223.
113. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 71 (a special comment from three of the committee members).
114. Id. at 198.
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same level. Therefore, the efficiency objective is of little weight in punctur-
ing the NRI.
The following analysis relates to several generations of power plant
owners. The original owner of the waterfall is named "the first generation."
The developer of the power plant is "the second generation," and "the third
generation" is a later acquirer of the power plant. This perspective is not
considered in the NOU. "15
7. Investment and Return on Stockholders' Equity
Basically, the 2004 committee ignores the dissimilarities of the return
on capital (ROC) between private- and public-sector investments. The sta-
tistics on ROCll 6 are insufficient because accounts are easily manipulated,
for instance, by changing debt ratio. Finance theory recognizes that such
manipulations do not result in any change to the wealth of the investors
because the capital ownership risks vary accordingly. On the other hand, a
fully comprehensive picture is possible by using Economic Value Analysis
(EVA), which is the ROC for aggregate capital. Whether the return on pri-
vate stockholders' equity is less than public investment does not indicate
investor discrimination.
8. Investment Discount According to Net Present Value
The 2004 NOU fails to analyze the investment discount according to
net present value. Lacking a comparison between ventures of unlimited
time and sixty-year investments deteriorates the understanding of differ-
ences. Using income on one U.S. dollar a year at an interest rate of ten
percent to illustrate the variations, we see that the net present value differ-
ences of sixty years and infinite income, which ranks to 0.0328, is a differ-
ence of one-third percent. If the interest is seven percent a year, the relative
loss is approximately 1.7 percent. The calculations do not consider future
leasing agreements. Minor divergences are valid under EEA law, and as
indicated, the amount is negligible, i.e., much less than differences in
wages cost. Since trade deterioration results from an illegal subsidy greater
than de minimis, EEA Article 61(1) is not breached.
This is also the EU Commission and the ESA position: the interpreta-
tion of the surveillance agencies is that the distortion-of-competition re-
115. See id. at 95 (a minority states that we got "a generation perspective, which however has not
achieved the attention that it deserves"). This group's perspective is somewhat narrower than the one
that I pursue: "future generations possibility to govern own natural resources." Id.
116. See, e.g., NOREoS OFFISIELLE STATISTIKK: ELEKTRISITETSSTATISTIKK 1999 [OFFICIAL
STATISTICS OF NORWAY: ELECTRICITY STATISTICS 1999] 59 (2001).
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quirement should result in the view that modest subsidization is always
excluded from the subject matter law of EEA Article 61(1). Clearly, be-
tween 0.3 percent and 1.7 percent is within the de minimis requirement. If,
as often is the case, former owners of power plants are granted leasing
rights, differences among private, communal, and state owned stations are
unnoticeable.
9. The Problem of Investment Cost
Since the income side of the equation fails to meet the subsidy criteria,
examining the differences in costs between private and public ownership is
a must. If assertions about illegal state aid to the public are valid, evidence
should verify the 2004 NOU's subsidy position. Do private owners' costs
exceed municipal plants' costs? If so, private margins are more minor than
the public and, consequently, distortion of interstate competition is manif-
est. Breach of EEA competition law is subject to individual adjudication;
both factual and legal elements regarding all groups of investors is in-
cluded. Since revenues are nearly identical, a positive conclusion on subsi-
dy requires that a private purchase is more expensive than a public
purchase for identical waterfalls and power plants. An increase in price
causes higher finance costs, which ultimately prompts an EEA Article 61
subsidy. Thus, are there any price differences?
One position is that reversion is a taking when owners are forced to
abandon their possession of constructions and buildings for the purpose of
building power plants. The position that this is an illegal confiscation is
related to the loss of future gains on the initial purchase of waterfalls.1 17
Thus, the dereliction of ownership rights results from the confiscation of
future utilization gains. If a buyer refuses to pay full price in the case of
reversion at the end of year sixty, then the loss is taken by the original
owner, not by any of the successors. According to case law,118 Norwegian
courts have ruled that waterfall resources are the possession of the Norwe-
gians in common. 119 One view is that private venture entrepreneurs may
take advantage of waterfall resources within a limit of sixty years. The
overall goal was that a project should not disenfranchise future generations'
possibility of controlling the right of use. 120 The objective was to attract
117. See Constitution of Norway § 105.
118. Rt. 1914 s. 205 (Judge Siwers); Rt. 1918 s.401.
119. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 155 (the principal view by three members of the committee).
120. Id. at 68.
2011] 129
CHICA GO-KENT LA WREVIEW
private investments in power plants by selling electricity rights for a limited
timeframe only. 121
How should the NRI be characterized? The expropriation position
failed in 1918. As stated by the District Court, as well as the Supreme
Court, reversion is not about cession and appropriation, but is simply a
provision that purposely regulates possession indiscriminately without the
transfer to anyone.122 Thus, reversion is the instrument by which Norway
prescribes-ratione jurisdictione temporae-the cession of lawful use of
power plants. Instead of a total ban on private utilization of waterfalls, the
admitted private investors should enjoy such rights until the end of sixty
years (originally eighty years). Thus, the parliament is entitled to limit pri-
vate rights.123 As no expropriation was identified, the original owner of a
"chaste waterfall" is the person who renders inadequate compensation for
the loss of future gains. This shows that the first private generations do
purchase waterfalls cheaper than public companies that have the burden of
paying the full price of interminable waterfall rights. Consequently, the
public owners of power plants suffer from original disadvantages; however,
these disadvantages are somewhat neutralized by their technical lifetime
which exceeds sixty years.
This conclusion is contradictory to the one reached by the 2004 com-
mittee. First, it is not the private party that is paying the most for the water-
fall and thus has the burden of excessive financial costs. Second, the
private entrepreneur and later successors enjoy sixty years of advantageous
depreciation provisions.124 While the depreciation time for publicly owned
power plants is sixty-seven years, NRI-ridden private enterprise is fully
written down at the end of the sixtieth year. In terms of linear depreciation,
private owners gain ten percent of original value. Thus, private power
companies' gains accumulated surplus, which is available for the purpose
of investment, and in this manner, improves their competitive position.
Private companies thus enjoy supreme competitive strength, which is de-
nied by the NOU.125 The loss of income is fully charged to the first genera-
tion of possessors of chaste waterfalls, not to the second.
121. See WLHELM KEILHAU, DET NORSKE FOLKS LIV OG HISTORIE [THE NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S
LIFE AND HISTORYJ 158 (1938) (The 1917 act took remedial measures against "foreign capital im-
ports .... The Swedes gained courage to make the most of international funding when everything was
at stake ... while the Norwegians refused to venture the possibilities and therefore left the expedient
time for development behind.").
122. Rt. 1914 s. 205 (Judge Siwers).
123. Rt. 1918 s. 401.
124. Lov om skatt av formue og inntekt (skatteloven) 26 mars 1999 nr. 14 §§ 18-6(l)-(2).
125. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 224.
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Consequently, the 2004 NOU fails because the price for NRI-
restricted waterfalls is lower than the ones owned publicly. Thus, the com-
petition benefits, due to the lower financial costs, are benefitting private
investors rather than public companies. Nevertheless, there seem to be in-
significant margins either way during concession periods.
10. Investment Strength Versus Subsidization
The 2004 NOU points to differences in investment strength as the ba-
sic competition problem in the electricity sector. As mentioned, the arbi-
trary treatment of public and private power companies leads to market
discrimination.
The link between the financial position of the participants and the ban
on subsidization according to Article 61(1) does not relate to investment
strength. The NRI alone does not produce the investment strength differ-
ences. While Norway taxes economic rent of the hydroelectric power,126
subsidy is the answer in competing countries. Sweden uses "el-
certificates," 27 which are distributed for free to green-power producers and
which are "forced upon" established power producers.1 28 Denmark sup-
ports wind-power production by a system of extra payment for kWh, which
exceeds a stipulated minimum price, the so called "fixed feed in tariffs."1 29
It is disputed whether such remedies are valid according to EU competition
law. 130
Focus is on the discrepancies between public and private ownership in
relation to the NRI. One question is whether illicit state aid occurs consi-
dering differences in depreciation because private companies enjoy a stee-
per depreciation curve than public companies.131 Since private companies
enjoy the method of declining balance depreciation, which is prohibited for
public companies,1 32 the tax law more than compensates for possible defi-
ciencies resulting from the NRI.1 33 Thus, no plants at the sixtieth year
have carrying value.
126. Id. at 44.
127. See Prop. 1 S (2009-2010) Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til stortingsvedtak), FOR
BUDSJETTARET 2010 (Proposisjon, Olje- og energidepartementet, 13.10.2009] 16 (Nor.).
128. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 45.
129. Id at 46.
130. The question on illegality was raised by the EU competition Directorate in June 2005, and its
investigation ended up in the 2009 support framework for renewables.
131. Skatteloven, supra note 124.




Therefore, the problem and fact description need to be refined. What
facts did the 2004 committee rely on? "[T]o promote competition and ...
as much efficient resources use as possible, should . .. every prosperous
possessor of hydroelectric power plants face identical frames?" Here, it
seems that the notion of "every" relates to those suffering from the sixtieth
year reversion mechanism.
11. The Art of Ruling the Market
In theory, the single electricity market creates one price for all pro-
ducers, whether public or private, regardless of reversion period.134 Eco-
nomic explanations for why producers may take an exorbitant price out of
the market include market inertia, the system of lump sum contracts, or
personal negligence of economic benefits from changing primary suppli-
ers. 135 Thus, practice indicates that consumers lose in market oriented leg-
islation. 136
According to the strategies of corporate economics, producers always
maximize profits and grab the excess price, the results of which are sales
promotions in markets with paramount pecuniary contributions. 137 Subse-
quently, a rise in domestic price will inevitably occur. To that effect, the
underwater high voltage transmission lines to Finland and the Baltic
States,138 Great Britain, Germany,139 and the Netherlands140 contribute.
Since the price in continental Europe is up to three times higher than in
Scandinavia,141 cables as projected and already built result in higher Scan-
dinavian prices.142 My conclusion is that fuel-free green electricity will
134. Id at 205.
135. But see THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 204 (Random House 1934)
(1899).
136. Lov om produksjon, omforming, overfering omsetning og fordeling av energi m.m 29 juni
1990 nr. 50.
137. Oystein Larsen-Vonstett & Ida Aamodt Hansen, Tror stromprisen oker, Verdens Gang (Aug.
6, 2004).
138. See Motion 2004/2005:N389 Elkabel till Finland [suggestion for a parliamentary decision]
(Swed.) (proposed by Lennart Beijer and others regarding high voltage transmission lines to Finland).
139. FINN R. AUNE, STATISTIK SENTRALBYRA, FREMSKRIVNINGER FOR KRAFTMARKEDET TIL 2020,
29 (2003) (At first, the Great Britain and Germany Project was turned down due to the fact that laying
cables to England or Germany is socio-economically unprofitable. The cost of cable construction and
operation is surmounting the sales.). I have documented that the rejected projects are now actual.
HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 19, 21.
140. See Press Release 146/04, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Transmission cable between
Norway and the Netherlands (Dec. 14, 2004) (on file with Chicago-Kent Law Review).
141. Delrapport-Morgondagens Energisystem [Interim Report-Tomorrow's system of energy] 34
(Sydkrafl 2004). Sydkraft stipulates that the price on electricity will sky rocket (up to 39%) by the
introduction to the European market. An updated version is Delrapport-Morgondagens Energisystem
MOSES [Interim Report-Tomorrow's system of energy] 39 (E.on 2005).
142. See discussion of market calculations in section HI.C.I.
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gradually replace coal. Further, the price in Scandinavia will increase as a
result of the implementation of liberalization. Subsequently, the contribu-
tion margin for producers of fuel-free green electricity will improve beyond
the levels predicted in the Scandinavian demand forecast. In Norway, this
development is a random gain nurturing the financial statements of nine
private power producers under the NRI.
12. Electricity Purchase in a Speculative Market
The electricity market pricing is challenged by actors who have no in-
terest in the physical power, but whose purpose is short selling futures or
derivates. Such speculative activity resulted in the division of the Nord
Pool into a commodity exchange through the subsidiary Nord Pool Spot AS
(trading physical electricity only) and the derivate stock exchange in 2002
(Nord Pool ASA). Interest in the power company stock is motivated by
possible stock exchange gains. This drive for speculative profit is far out-
side of the scope of the 2004 NOU. The committee defined markets in
terms of "market based compensation" of power production plants in the
case of reversion under a scheme of calculating the market value of the site
according to a "mechanized set of objective criteria" or to "fix the market
value by negotiations and judicial assessment."1 43 The NOU does not con-
sider valuation as market demand.
My position is that prices result from supply and demand, not from a
peculiar theoretical value. The price for an NRI-encumbered power plant is
most likely dictated by anticipated speculative gain; neither financial cost
nor carrying value will do. The investment magnet is not financial cost, but
investment gains resulting from short selling. According to liberalization,
in spe consumers of fuel-free electricity will increase from eighteen million
inhabitants (Scandinavia) to 495 million EU citizens. 144 The motivation of
the investors is most likely a prosperous "bear market," not a modest stock
dividend. Due to hydro-electric power cost efficiency, Norwegian power
plants that produce green energy will prosper, competing with expensive
coal electricity.
The differences between reversion-free and reversion-burdened plants
are relatively small. Foreigners may buy up to twenty percent of shares in
private companies,1 45 which are concession-free and reversion-free. Fight-
143. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 193.
144. Energieverbrauch Soll Bis 2020 um 20 Prozent Sinken, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZErUNG
11 (Oct. 7, 2006) (The German prognosis is a decline in consumption of approximately twenty percent
by 2020).
145. Lov om erverv av vannfall m.v. 14 des. 1917 nr. 16 § 36.
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ing for the highest bid, private investors will most likely gain control due to
their focus on speculative gains, which definitely is not the case for mu-
nicipal owners and communes. For licensed take-over bids (beyond twenty
percent), a valid argument is that the value of the shares is converging to-
wards zero during sixty years. And the 2004 committee considers that pri-
vate investors are thus losing out to the public owners that are exempt fully
from the "reversion ghost." I cannot follow the arguments here, first of all,
because the Norwegian state regularly leases the reverted plants back to the
former owners. The lease usually does not reach astronomic proportions, as
the state is eager to let industrial companies flourish after the reversion.
Secondly, all private owners may sell their plants to municipal owners, thus
switching into a reversion-free regime. 146 This simply means that the sixty-
year period of speculations and day trading does not end up in a big zero.
Shares privately owned may always succeed to local municipalities and
thus suspend the reversion.
The real-life switching between speculations and per-kWh-net-gain
sales shows that the 2004 NOU got it all wrong. European Court of Justice
(ECJ) case law on free transfer of capital and the prohibition on Member
States restrictions protect speculations gains.147 While differences between
long term investments and day trading are huge, the ECJ does not diversify;
investments are under an identical regime. 148 Thus, concession schemes
and judicial assessment are banned. Investors are treated similarly whether
bottles of water or power plants are for sale.
The 2004 NOU's view that "waterfalls benefitting from an indefinite
concession have a higher value than concessions suffering under the limita-
tion of time,"149 simply overlooks the fact that an investor's only purpose
is to extract windfall profits and speculations gains. Finally, it should be
mentioned that no one needs to own power plants to buy and sell electric-
ity; by open access to Nord Pool Spot AS, interested parties, may trade
electricity, irrespective of nationality (as illustrated by the entry of Enron in
146. Id. § 4.
147. See, e.g.; Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Sweden, Case C-249/06,
T 42 (2009) ("It is common ground that the agreements at issue do not contain any provision reserving
such possibilities for the Community to restrict movements of funds connected with investments. It is
therefore necessary to examine whether the Kingdom of Sweden was, for that reason, under an obliga-
tion to take the appropriate steps to which the second paragraph of Article 307 EC refers (paragraph
33) ... It is common ground that, in the cases referred to by the Commission, the Kingdom of Sweden
did not take any steps, within the period prescribed by the Commission in its reasoned opinion, with
regard to the third countries concerned in order to eliminate the risk of conflict with measures liable to
be adopted by the Council under Articles 57(2) EC, 59 EC and 60(1) EC").
148. Case C-302/97 Konle v. Republic of Austria T 27-32 (June 1, 1999), available at
http://curia.europa.eu.
149. HJEMFALL,supra note 5, at 71.
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early 2000). Perhaps private companies are challenging NRI (especially
Norsk Hydro) for no reason other than a drive towards "Direct Unproduc-
tive Profitseeking" (DUP) (i.e., harvesting the gain of switching from pos-
sibly a few years of income to everlasting sales income).
13. A Few Points Regarding the Purchase of a Power Plant
Having considered the price of electricity, some comments are needed
on the purchase of power plants. While Section 5 of the 1917 Act on Manu-
facture Concessions relates to private actors, Section 4 relates to state and
communal companies.150 There are three differences. First, public owners
enjoy indefinite concessions, while private owners are under a sixty-year
limitation. Second, public owners originally suffered from the obligation to
deliver electrical power, the so-called principle of compulsory regional
supply. Third, public producers are fully under governmental control,151
which is open to political preferences that exclude business profitability,
reducing its competitive advantage.
The energy policy of public companies may include non-commercial
terms. In questioning whether market-based thinking is the appropriate
answer to energy challenges, the 2004 committee splits. A minority sup-
porting governmental command criticizes the sign of equality between
optimizing business profitability and public Utility.152 Decisive for the ma-
jority is that the immunity from the NRI is, in itself, subsidization and thus
causes distortion of competition. That is all.1 53 The committee does not
scrutinize whether communal companies would pay more for power plants
than private contenders, for instance, because purchase brings spinoffs such
as increased activity on "Main Street."' 54
My position is that although power plants got a remaining value by the
end of the sixtieth year, which means that the government is confiscating
more than economic rent,155 reversion-immune power plants are not neces-
150. Lov om erverv av vannfall m.v., supra note 145, at §§ 4-5.
151. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 146 (a special remark from the committee member Martinsen).
152. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 144-45.
153. This is rather peculiar since the surveillance agency (ESA), in its opinion of Feb. 20, 2002,
does not raise that argument. See Decision 32-02, EFTA Surveillance Auth. decision of 20 Feb. 2002
regarding support to film production and film related activities, at 18, available at http:
http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/norway/nr/1085. For the committee's argument, see
HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 79, 210, 229-35.
154. See HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 94 (minority member, Felix, notes, "[t]he transition from
production to the benefit of local society sold at cost, to the maximum profit by delivery through Nord
Pool has dramatically changed the incentives.").
155. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 197.
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sarily subject to state aid resulting in a beneficial surplus economic rent. I
do not, however, consider these issues here.
CONCLUSION
The EU/EEA competition laws exclude national state aid. However,
green technology is cost-inefficient. A competitive electricity market is
promoting the status quo, which blocks or delays newer, more expensive
solutions. Subsidization is needed to achieve political goals. Such subsidi-
zation schemes are the Green Certificates of Sweden and the in spe EU and
Norway certificates, the markets of which are supposed to amalgamate.
The NRI subsidization cases illustrate law and economics mechan-
isms-market mechanisms that rule the individual sales policies. The con-
clusion of the 2004 committee on reversion is ambiguous due to an inade-
inadequate legal analysis. The preconditions of EEA Article 61(1) are ill-
considered or not considered at all. The 2004 report does not substantiate
that the Nord Pool price of electricity due to the reversion "influences upon
the EEA trade" (i.e., the cross border trade),156 which is necessary to in-
itiate the subsidization prohibition in Article 61(1). The Norwegian market
segment-consisting of state, local, and regional municipalities and private
power producers-compares with the competing foreign companies. Clear-
ly the NRI is disadvantageous to the domestic industry because only Nor-
wegian plants suffer from the drawback caused by reversion.
The price of electricity is not cost-based, but market-based. An inves-
tor's willingness to pay for derivates of electricity is driven by speculation
rather than dictated by electricity sales gains. Due to a lower firsthand price
compared with those selling to the public, the economic loss caused by the
NRI is allocated with the primary owner of the unregulated waterfall.
During-production, private buyers prosper from a depreciation policy
more advantaged than the scheme offered to publicly owned plants. At the
end of the reversion period (sixtieth year), the carrying value of the plant is
zero, which shows that the owner enjoys the economic rent in fill.
Thus, state aid is here infra legem. Green energy developers may re-
ceive subsidies without breaching the EEA Article 61(1) as long as inter-
state trade is not affected by electricity dumping or down-pricing. Only if
pricing down threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertak-
ings or the production of certain goods is such a breach validated. If profit
margins are generous, state aid to fuel-free electricity production is unprob-
lematic.
156. HJEMFALL, supra note 5, at 230.
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Finally, this study shows that new fuel-free power plants, which in-
itially are subject to public funding and advantageous conditions, are clear
of subsidies charges because of reversion at the end. The national take-over
conditions are designed so as to counterbalance the initial advantageous
situation. Thus, since NRI policy is a substantial drawback for private own-
ers, a national reversion policy that balances the benefits of the initial phase
may prove valid in relation to subsidy accusations.

